Licensing -- Driver's license -- Suspension -- Refusal to submit to breath test -- Lawfulness of stop -- Where officer was outside his jurisdiction when he initiated traffic stop for speeding and none of exceptions authorizing extra-jurisdictional stop were applicable, stop was not lawful -- Final order of license suspension is quashed
STATE OF FLORIDA vs. ALEXANDRAGIVENS. Circuit Court, 4th Judicial Circuit (Appellate) in and for Duval County. Case No. 2013-CA-010062, Division CV-B. January 19, 2016. Jason Helfant, DHSMV, Tallahassee, for Plaintiff. Janet E. Johnson, Jacksonville, for Defendant.

STATE OF FLORIDA vs. ALEXANDRA GIVENS. Circuit Court, 4th Judicial Circuit (Appellate) in and for Duval County

(COLE, Judge.) This cause came before this Court upon the Petition of Writ of Certiorari filed by the Petitioner, AlexandraGivens. Givensis seeking review of the Final Order of License Suspension of the Respondent, Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (Department), sustaining the administrative suspension of her driver's license for refusing to submit to a breath test. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Article V, Section 5(b), Florida Constitution, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.030(c) and sections 322.2613(13) and 322.31, Florida Statutes (2015).

I. Factual Background and Procedural History
On September 20, 2013, Officer Moore of the Atlantic Beach Police Department was operating stationary radar at 1600 Atlantic Blvd. at approximately 8:30 P.M. Officer Moore tracked Petitioner's vehicle at 73 MPH in a 45 MPH zone and pulled Petitioner over at 13400 Atlantic Blvd., within Jacksonville city limits, for speeding. The Petitioner and Officer Moore crossed the Intracoastal Waterway Bridge. While driving over the bridge, Officer Moore turned on his blue lights. As acknowledged by Officer Moore, he was outside of his jurisdiction when he turned on his blue lights and conducted a traffic stop. Officer Moore requested Petitioner to furnish license, registration, and insurance, which she did. Officer Moore then began a DUI investigation and requested Petitioner to exit the vehicle. The Petitioner was ultimately placed under arrest for DUI and transported to the Pre-Trial Detention Facility. At the Jail, Petitioner was requested to submit to a breath test. Petitioner refused to submit to a breath test.

A formal review hearing was held on October 17, 2013. At that hearing Officer Moore was called to testify. In addition, the hearing officer considered documentary evidence, which included the DUI Uniform Traffic Citation, Arrest and Booking Report, Field Sobriety Report, Implied Consent Form, and Refusal Affidavit. Following that hearing, the hearing officer upheld the Petitioner's driver's license suspension. This appeal followed.

II. Standard of Review
On certoriari review of administrative action, this Court's duty is to determine whether procedural due process was accorded, whether the essential requirements of law have been observed, and whether the administrative findings and judgment are supported by competent, substantial evidence. City of Deerfield Beach v. Vaillant, 419 So.2d 624 (Fla. 1982); Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Favino, 667 So. 2d 305, 308 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) [20 Fla. L. Weekly D2222a]. This Court is not to reweigh evidence, nor to substitute its judgment for the findings of the hearing officer below. Education Dev. Ctr., Inc. v. City of West Palm Beach Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 541 So.2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1989); Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Smith, 687 So. 2d 30, 32 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) [22 Fla. L. Weekly D161a].

III. Application of Standard of Review to Petitioner's Claims
In order for the Department to uphold an administrative suspension, the hearing officer must determine the Petitioner was placed under lawful arrest. Therefore, the record must establish that the driver was lawfully stopped. Basich v. DHSMV, 17 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 407a (Duval County. March 30, 2010). The record in this case does not establish that Ms. Givenswas lawfully stopped because Officer Moore was outside his jurisdiction when he initiated the stop of the Petitioner.

Generally, an officer does not have the power to arrest outside the territorial boundaries of his or her jurisdiction. State v. Gelin, 844 So.2d 659 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) [28 Fla. L. Weekly D746b]; Porter v. State, 765 So.2d 76 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) [25 Fla. L. Weekly D2001a], cert. denied, 790 So.2d 1107 (Fla. 2001). Although there are exceptions to this rule, the record does not reflect that any exception applied here. In order to justify the stop based upon fresh pursuit, the officer must act without unnecessary delay, the pursuit must be continuous and uninterrupted, and there must be a close temporal relationship between the offense and the commencement of the pursuit. Basich, supra. In this case, Officer Moore set up a “speed trap” on Atlantic Boulevard, on the Jacksonville border, but he did not initiate the stop until he was outside his jurisdiction. Officer Moore observed the driving pattern a mile from where he activated his blue lights, thus initiating the stop well outside of his jurisdiction. He then arrested Ms. Givensoutside his jurisdiction.

Section 901.25 provides that the officer must reasonably believe that a person being pursued has committed a felony, a misdemeanor, or a violation of s. 316. In this case, the actions of Officer Moore do not meet this criteria. The Department has failed to address section 901.25(3), Fla. Stat., wherein “if an arrest is made . . . by an officer outside the county within which his . . . jurisdiction lies, the officer shall immediately notify the officer in charge of the jurisdiction in which the arrest is made.” This was not done in the present case. Further, there was no evidence in the record that the stop was made for any of the reasons set forth in section 901.25, Fla. Stat. The Court concludes that the essential requirements of law have not been observed and the administrative findings and judgment are not supported by competent, substantial evidence.


1. That the Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Certiorari is hereby GRANTED.
2. That the Final Order of License Suspension is hereby QUASHED.